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STANDARD ESSENTIAL PATENTS AND 
ANTITRUST LAW: BALANCING 
INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 
Kyle L. Greene* 
Antitrust and patent law have always been uneasy allies. 
Although both seek to encourage innovation and competition 
in the long run, patent law does so primarily by granting 
creators exclusive fiefdoms over their intellectual property, and 
antitrust law does so primarily by proscribing firms from 
anticompetitive conduct. Yet today’s world is flush with patent-
rich products and industries that depend on the fruitful, 
simultaneous application of both of these bodies of law.  
Industries reliant on flourishing networks, such as those in the 
information and communication technology sector, are 
particularly influenced by the intersection of antitrust and 
patent law.1 Because of the central importance of well-
functioning networks to these industries, many have developed 
standard setting organizations (“SSOs”) to designate technical 
standards that ensure product compatibility and 
interoperability between offerings from different firms. These 
standards incorporate many specific patents, known as 
standard essential patents (“SEPs”). Further, standards 
promulgated by SSOs oblige SEP holders to license their SEPs 
to implementers of the standard in a fair, reasonable, and non-
 
* J.D. Candidate 2020, Columbia Law School; B.A., 2016,  University 
of Massachusetts, Amherst. Thanks to the board and staff of the Columbia 
Business Law Review for their editorial support. They have valiantly strived 
to keep this note free of errors, and any that remain are entirely my own. 
1 A. Douglas Melamed & Carl Shapiro, How Antitrust Law Can Make 
FRAND Commitments More Effective, 127 YALE L.J. 2110, 2111 (2018) 
(“Compatibility standards comprise a critical part of the information and 
communications technology sector . . . . [M]any of the benefits generated by 
the recent and dramatic advances in information technology would have 
been difficult or impossible to achieve without compatibility standards.”). 
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discriminatory (“FRAND”) fashion.2 As a result, SEP holders 
and their counterparties stand, precariously, where antitrust 
and patent law meet.   
This Note will argue that an SEP holder who violates their 
FRAND commitments by unilaterally refusing to deal with a 
prospective implementer of the relevant standard should be 
presumed to have antitrust liability under Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act. In other words, such a firm should be presumed 
to have market power and to have participated in exclusionary 
conduct with anticompetitive effects. Part I will describe the 
landscape of standard setting, its effect on competition, and the 
place of antitrust and patent law in the standards landscape.  
Part II will explore the antitrust case law concerning refusals 
to deal in greater depth, paying particular attention to cases 
involving intellectual property and patents.  Finally, Part III 
will build off of the previous two Parts to make and justify the 
argument that SEP holders should face a presumption that 
they have violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act when they 
violate their FRAND commitments by refusing to deal. 
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2 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., PATENT CHALLENGES 
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Stephen A. Merrill eds., 2013).  
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I. THE BASICS: STANDARDS AND COMPETITION 
A. Standards, SSOs, and SEPs 
Standards are technical design specifications that detail 
how products or product components should be made in order 
to perform specific functions or successfully interact with 
other products and networks.3 Standards are important to 
many industries, but they are of critical importance to 
industries premised on the ability of products produced by 
different firms to work with each other and participate in a 
shared network.4 For instance, industries within the 
information and communication technology sector depend on 
compatibility standards for core product features, such as the 
ability of computers and cell phones to access Wi-Fi and 
broadband networks.5 Some industry standards emerge out of 
government regulation or the competitive dominance of a 
particular firm or product. However, many technology 
standards are developed by SSOs.6 These SSOs are private, 
cooperative organizations made up of members who 
communally agree to a process for developing and 
 
3 See id. at 1. 
4 See, e.g., Melamed & Shapiro, supra note 1, at 2112 (“The 
fundamental economics in the information technology sector, driven by 
network effects, implies that there is enormous value associated with 
establishing compatibility standards.”) (emphasis added). 
5 See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 2, at 
16. 
6 See Erik Hovenkamp, Tying, Exclusivity, and Standard-Essential 
Patents, 19 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 79, 81 (2017) (“When a complex 
technology requires widespread interoperability among different 
components, firms usually coordinate through a standard setting 
organization.”). 
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implementing standards, and then engage in that process 
together.7 
Standards developed by SSOs almost always incorporate 
patent-protected technologies that are held by participating 
members in the SSO.8 Patents on a technology necessary to 
fulfill an industry standard are called standard essential 
patents.9 In practical terms, SEPs are patents which must 
either be licensed or infringed upon by implementers of the 
standard.10 As a result, the inclusion of a patented technology 
in an industry standard grants the SEP holder a great deal of 
power relative to any given implementer of the standard. In 
sectors that develop standards in order to coordinate and 
foster beneficial network effects, the market power of a SEP 
holder continues to grow as the standard becomes more widely 
used and access to the relevant network becomes more 
valuable. 
SSOs have adopted rules and policies regarding 
intellectual property rights to prevent the abuse of this power. 
One set of rules is concerned with disclosures—they aim to 
make sure that participating members in an SSO are clear 
about which of their patents would be classified as SEPs 
under a given standard.11 Of particular interest and 
importance are those rules which require SEP holders to 
license their SEPs to prospective and current implementers 
on “fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory” terms.12 “Fair 
and reasonable” refers to the price implementers must pay to 
license the SEP, commonly paid in the form of royalty 
 
7 Examples of SSO-developed standards include internet standards 
(Ethernet, Wi-Fi, and TCP-IP), mobile standards (GSM, 3G, and CDMA), 
and many others (e.g., HDMI for audio/visual data and NFC for short-range 
wireless data transfers). See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., 
supra note 2, at 31–34. 
8 Id. at 1 (“Incorporating patented or patent-pending technologies in 
standards is virtually inevitable and generally beneficial . . . .”). 
9 Id. (referencing SSO policies for “patents essential to the standards 
they create (so-called standard-essential patents or SEPs)”). 
10 See id. at 38. 
11 See id. at 39–44 (discussing common features in a disclosure regime). 
12 See id. at 17–18 (generally, SSO’s either encourage or require 
member firms to license under the FRAND framework). 
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payments.13 “Non-discriminatory” typically refers to an SEP 
holder’s obligation to license to all implementers and potential 
implementers of the standard, at prices and terms which are 
comparable to those offered to other implementers.14 FRAND 
commitments are a contractual limitation on what a SEP 
holder may do with its—otherwise more conduct-permissive—
patent.15   
Standard setting organizations, the standards they 
develop, and the rules and policies they agree to are the result 
of intense collaboration between horizontal competitors and 
parties normally engaged in vertical business dealings. 
Additionally, as noted above, standards often confer 
significant power to SEP holders. Despite this, the U.S. 
antitrust agencies recognize that standards are “widely 
acknowledged to be one of the engines driving the modern 
economy”16 and that the SSO process of developing standards 
“can produce substantial benefits.”17 In particular, the 
antitrust agencies recognize the value that compatibility 
standards add—for consumers as well as firms—in industries 
that rely on network effects.18 Still, the activity of SSOs, the 
 
13 See Hovenkamp, supra note 6, at 31-35. 
14 Id. 
15 See Timothy J. Muris, Bipartisan Patent Reform and Competition 
Policy, AM. ENTERPRISE INST.,  May 2017, at 2 http://www.aei.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/05/Bipartisan-Patent-Reform-and-Competition-
Policy.pdf [https://perma.cc/L8HV-2PX5]. 
16 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST 
ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING 





[https://perma.cc/WCK4-V2C9] (the DOJ Antitrust Division and Federal 
Trade Commission are the primary enforcers of federal antitrust law). 
17 Id. at 34. 
18 See id. at 33 (“Standards make networks, such as the Internet and 
wireless telecommunications, more valuable by allowing products to 
interoperate.”); FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: 
ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 191 (2011), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/evolving-ip-
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standards they create, and the SEP holders they empower are 
not immune from antitrust liability. 
B. SEP Holders and Patent Hold-up  
Standard setting organizations, the antitrust authorities, 
and legal academics have historically focused on an abuse of 
SEP holder power known as “patent hold-up.”19 This makes 
hold-up an especially practical concept to examine in 
introducing the basics of SEP holder power, and a useful entry 
point for a discussion of refusals to deal by SEP holders. The 
theory of patent hold-up warns that SEP holders will be able 
to charge significantly higher licensing fees for their patents 
after they are included in the standard than they could have 
charged before. Any alternative technologies, even very 
similar alternatives, to the SEP-protected technology before 
the implementation of the standard are no longer viable 
alternatives after the standard has been developed and 
implemented. As a result, SEP holders find themselves in a 
position to “hold-up” prospective implementers of the 
standard. This vulnerability of standard implementers to 
abusive pricing emerges for two principle economic reasons.  
First, standards implementers frequently engage in 
licensing negotiations with SEP holders after they have begun 
developing or selling a standard-dependent product or 
component. The sheer volume of patents involved in various 
standards makes it impractical for the implementer to 
negotiate each patent license ex ante.20 As a result, when the 




[hereinafter The Evolving IP Marketplace] (“In many IT industries, 
interoperability among products and their components is critical to 
developing and introducing innovative products that satisfy a range of 
consumer needs.”). 
19 See Hovenkamp, supra note 6, at 84 (“[S]cholars agree that . . .  
[FRAND’s] general objectives are . . . to prevent SEP holders from engaging 
in ‘patent holdup’ . . . .”). 
20 See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 2, at 
55. 
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licenses, they have already made investments into meeting 
the relevant standard. At that point, the cost of switching is 
high and thus implementers are essentially locked-in.21 Given 
this dynamic, it is rational for the implementer to pay an 
inflated licensing fee in order to avoid losing its previous 
investments. 
The following is a stylized example demonstrating the 
basic logic of this situation. Suppose you could purchase a cone 
with a scoop of ice cream for $5, or you could first purchase a 
scoop of ice cream for $3 and then a cone separately—the price 
of the cone by itself is not clear ex ante but they are typically 
sold for around $1. You decide to purchase the scoop of ice 
cream for $3 and then go to buy the cone. However, the seller 
of the cone will now only offer it to you at $3.  While you would 
rather not pay $3 for the cone—bringing your total to $6—
your only alternatives are to let the $3 scoop go to waste and 
leave, or let the $3 scoop go to waste and buy a new combined 
cone plus scoop of ice cream for $5. The first alternative means 
you have simply lost $3, and the second alternative means you 
have paid $8 total for a $5 cone with ice cream scoop (i.e. also 
lost $3 by throwing your first scoop away). As a result, a 
rational purchaser would purchase the cone at its inflated $3 
price and end up paying $6 for what you could have purchased 
for $5 (and have effectively lost $1). Because of this “lock-in” 
pricing dynamic between buyer and seller, you have been 
held-up for $1. 
Network effects are the second major source of 
implementer vulnerability to abusive pricing by the SEP 
holder. The presence of strong network effects, which are 
purposefully accentuated by many industry standards, 
dictates that much of the value of a standard comes from the 
fact that other firms and consumers are building and buying 
standards-compliant products.22 Although a patent 
 
21 See Melamed & Shapiro, supra note 1, at 2113 (“[A]t the time of 
negotiation, implementers are locked into the standard and the technologies 
claimed by the SEPs . . . .”). 
22 See Marina Lao, Networks, Access, and “Essential Facilities”: From 
Terminal Railroad to Microsoft, 62 SMU L. REV. 557, 560 (2009) (“The 
defining characteristic of network industries is the increasing value of their 
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incorporated into a standard may only have been 
incrementally superior to other alternatives at the time the 
standard was created, the value of that patent to prospective 
implementers of the established standard following the 
standard’s promulgation derives from the need to license it to 
access an extremely valuable network.  SEP holders will then 
try to capture some of this network-derived value in their 
licensing fee, demanding a price that reflects both the 
incremental value of the patent itself and a portion of the 
value of the standard’s total network effects.23 Implementers 
who pay this inflated licensing fee have, because of network 
effects, been effectively “held-up.”  
The antitrust agencies have been seriously concerned by 
the negative effects of hold-up for decades.24 In particular, the 
FTC has brought seven actions based on the hold-up theory.25 
Numerous private suits have been brought alleging that SEP 
holders violated their FRAND commitments and attempted to 
engage in a hold-up.26 The “FR” in “FRAND”—standing for 
“fair” and “reasonable”—was largely put in place by SSOs to 
prevent SEP holders from profitably engaging in hold-up after 
their inclusion in the standard.  
Recently, there has been some debate over whether or not 
hold-up is as problematic as advertised. Critics of antitrust 
 
products to users as the number of users increases, a phenomenon called 
‘network effects’ or demand-side economies of scale.”). 
23 See Melamed & Shapiro, supra note 1, at 2114 (“If the standard is 
commercially successful, implementers are willing to pay a much larger 
royalty for use of the patented technology than they would have paid ex 
ante, when the SEP holder faced competition from other technologies.”). 
24 See Statement of Terrell McSweeny, Comm’r, Federal Trade 
Commission, Holding the Line on Patent Holdup: Why Antitrust 
Enforcement Matters 2 (March 21, 2018) 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1350033/mc
sweeny_-_the_reality_of_patent_hold-up_3-21-18.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/YE26-L4T9] (“The agencies’ 2007 Report devoted over 20 
pages to discussing the patent ‘holdup problem.’”). 
25 Id. at 6 n.21. 
26 See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 864 F. Supp. 2d 1023 
(W.D. Wash. 2012); Realtek Semiconductor Corp. v. LSI Corp., 946 F. Supp. 
2d 998 (N.D. Cal. 2013); Apple, Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc., 886 F. Supp. 
2d 1061 (W.D. Wis. 2012). 
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concern with hold-up have attacked the theory on two 
grounds. First, critics say the problem is overstated and lacks 
empirical evidence.27 Second, they say that the proper way to 
address hold-up problems is through contract law, rather than 
antitrust law.28 Makan Delrahim, the Assistant Attorney 
General in charge of the Antitrust Division of the Department 
of Justice, has repeatedly questioned the severity of hold-up 
and whether or not there is an important role for antitrust to 
play in combating it. In a 2017 speech, he argued that “[i]f a 
patent holder is alleged to have violated a commitment to a 
standard setting organization, that action may have some 
impact on competition. But . . . that does not mean the heavy 
hand of antitrust necessarily is the appropriate remedy for the 
would-be licensee.”29 Delrahim is not alone in his skepticism. 
Richard Epstein and Kayvan Noroozi, for example, have also 
 
27 See, e.g., Jonathan M. Barnett, Has the Academy Led Patent Law 
Astray?, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1316, 1344–61 (2017) (disputing the 
prevalence of hold-up problems); Alexander Galetovic et al., An Empirical 
Examination of Patent Holdup, 11 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 549, 572 
(2015) (arguing that the empirical evidence does not support hold-up 
problems). 
28 Assistant Attorney General Makan Delrahim spoke directly to this 
point, noting that: 
It . . . would be a mistake to infer that a contractual FRAND 
commitment somehow establishes a duty under the 
antitrust laws to license on terms demanded by a licensee or 
that violations of an ambiguous FRAND term become an 
antitrust violation. Transforming such a contract obligation 
into an antitrust duty would undermine the purpose of the 
antitrust laws and the patent laws themselves . . . .  
Makan Delrahim, Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, Antitrust Law and Patent Licensing in the New Wild West, 
Remarks as Prepared for IAM’s Patent Licensing Conference 8–9 (Sept. 18, 
2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/file/1095011/download 
[https://perma.cc/QK75-FBA6].  
29 Makan Delrahim, Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, Take It to the Limit: Respecting Innovation Incentives in 
the Application of Antitrust Law, Remarks as Prepared for Delivery at USC 
Gould School of Law 8 (Nov. 10, 2017), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/file/1010746/download 
[https://perma.cc/68ZX-DUB7]. 
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questioned the focus on hold-up in a recent article and 
suggested that, “courts and policymakers in the United States 
should be far more concerned with the risk of ‘patent 
holdout.’”30  
In spite of these rebuttals to the dangers of hold-up and to 
the relevance of antitrust, most academics and practitioners 
continue to take seriously the problem of hold-up and the 
place for antitrust law in ameliorating the problems it creates. 
Technology industry participants,31 legal academics, 
corporations,32 and current antitrust enforcers33 have all 
reaffirmed their view of SEP hold-up as a relevant practice 
that is dangerous to competition and best addressed, at least 
 
30 Richard A. Epstein & Kayvan B. Noroozi, Why Incentives for 
“Patent Holdout” Threaten to Dismantle FRAND, and Why It Matters, 32 
BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1381, 1384 (2017). The “holdout” problem 
emphasized by Epstein and Noroozi refers to the situation where a 
standard implementer (or any other patent infringer) willfully negotiates 
in bad faith over patent licensing, infringes on the patent, and forces the 
patent holder to either accept the mediocre licensing terms or bear the risk 
and cost of litigation. Epstein and Noroozi are particularly concerned with 
the threat this type of behavior poses to the incentive to innovate, noting 
that: 
[I]nnovators will have no interest in entering such a 
marketplace unless they first receive assurances that they 
can expect a reasonable risk-adjusted profit that exceeds 
their opportunity cost . . . . The FRAND contract is thus 
meant to solve a host of coordination problems between 
potential bilateral monopolists seeking technology-driven 
standardization. Their goal is to create innovation-driven 
standards that reward the efforts of each contributor. 
 Id. at 1392–93.  
31 See Response from the App Ass’n et al., Standards, Licensing, and 
Innovation: A Response to DOJ AAG’s Comments on Antitrust Law and 
Standard-Setting 4, 8–21 (May 30, 2018),  
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_comments/2018/08/ftc-
2018-0055-d-0031-155033.pdf [https://perma.cc/AJ3V-92XG].  
32 See Letter from Aces Health et al., Industry Letter to Assistant 
Attorney Gen. Delrahim Regarding Standards, Innovation and Licensing 1 
(Jan. 24, 2018), http://www.ccianet.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/01/Industry-Letter-to-DOJ-AAG.pdf  
[https://perma.cc/BH6A-CJAS]. 
33 See McSweeney, supra note 24, at 1. 
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in some cases, by antitrust law. As A. Douglas Melamed and 
Carl Shapiro write in the Yale Law Journal, “[w]e believe that 
those who share our concerns [about hold-up] have by far the 
stronger argument. The risk of ex post opportunism [by SEP 
holders] is very real.”34 While there is a livelier debate on the 
issue now than there has been in the recent past, there is no 
reason to think that antitrust is—or should be—retreating 
from its engagement with the problem of hold-up or abusive 
behavior by SEP holders in general. 
C. SEP Holders and Refusals to Deal 
The problem of patent hold-up and the inflated prices that 
SEP holders are able to charge implementers are well-known 
and extensively discussed among policymakers, academics, 
and practitioners. However, an SEP holder can engage in 
other anticompetitive practices subsequent to the inclusion of 
its patent in an industry standard. The practice of an SEP 
holder unilaterally refusing to deal—where an SEP holder 
selectively refuses to license its essential patent to a potential 
implementer—is especially noteworthy. Firms and 
individuals typically have broad latitude to deal or not deal 
with whomever they please,35 an affordance even more clear 
in the realm of patents.36 Yet the refusal to deal is not an 
absolute or unqualified right, even for a patent holder.37 Given 
 
34 See Melamed & Shapiro, supra note 1, at 2116. 
35 See Verizon Commc’ns., Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 
540 U.S. 398, 408 (2004) (“Thus, as a general matter, the Sherman Act ‘does 
not restrict the long-recognized right of [a] trader or manufacturer engaged 
in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own independent 
discretion as to parties with whom he will deal.’”) (alteration in original) 
(quoting United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919)). 
36 See In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1328 
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (“It is the infringement defendant and not the patentee that 
bears the burden to show that one of these exceptional situations exists and, 
in the absence of such proof . . . . ”). 
37 See id. at 1326 (“The patentee’s right to exclude, however, is not 
without limit.”); see also Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 
472 U.S. 585, 601 (1985) (“The absence of a duty to transact business with 
another firm is . . . the counterpart of the independent businessman’s 
cherished right to select his customers and his associates. The high value 
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the powerful position that an SEP holder is in, its right to 
refuse to deal with standard implementers should be 
constrained to prevent abuses. When a patent holder is 
transformed into a SEP holder by inclusion in an industry 
standard, a refusal to license its SEP should trigger 
aggressive antitrust skepticism that recognizes the powerful 
market position the patent holder suddenly occupies and the 
contractual (FRAND) commitments that were made in order 
to be granted that position.  
There are three key theories of the harm brought about by 
an SEP holder’s refusal to license. First, by selectively 
refusing to deal with potential implementers who compete 
directly with the SEP holder in a secondary component 
market, an SEP holder could use its SEP to gain or maintain 
control of the component market.38 Those implementers 
wishing to purchase fully built components from the SEP 
holder would be permitted to do so, but those implementers 
who would use the SEP to build a competing component would 
not be.   
Second, even if the SEP holder did not produce the 
component—or, in this case, the consumer product—in 
question, the SEP holder could create a monopolist or cadre of 
oligopolists in the secondary market through its selective 
refusals to deal.  Then, the SEP holder could charge inflated 
licensing fees to those producers that remain in the secondary 
market.39 In this scenario, the inflated fees paid by the 
remaining producers function as a bribe to the SEP holder; in 
exchange for inflated fees, the SEP holder confers market 
 
that we have placed on the right . . . does not mean that [it] is unqualified.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
38 See Melamed & Shapiro, supra note 1, at 2126 (“[A] SEP holder’s 
refusal to license in violation of FRAND commitment under circumstances 
that enable or enhance the creation of market power in a related market not 
subject to a FRAND commitment would seem to violate Section 2.”). 
39 See id. (“[It] would seem to violate Section 2 . . . if the SEP holder’s 
refusal to deal enabled an unaffiliated implementer to gain market power 
for which it compensated the SEP holder by inflated royalties for a license 
to the SEPs or otherwise.” (footnote omitted)). 
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power to the producers.40 This allows the SEP holder to 
impose inflated licensing fees that violate its FRAND 
commitments without any concern that the implementers 
being forced to pay those fees would challenge them.   
Third, an SEP holder could use refusals to license as a 
negotiating tool. By selectively refusing to deal, the SEP 
holder could signal to other prospective licensees that it is 
willing to aggressively test the limits of its FRAND 
commitments in order to maximize licensing profits. For many 
implementers, it would be less costly to simply pay more to 
license the patent than it would be to aggressively negotiate 
for a fair rate and risk a refusal to license by the SEP holder, 
protracted litigation (potentially initiated by either party), or 
even a potential injunction that could block the implementer’s 
ability to fulfill the standard in question.41 This course of 
conduct highlights how an SEP holder’s refusal to license can 
accentuate the danger and damage of hold-up by setting the 
boundaries on licensing negotiation and vastly increasing the 
downside risk of the negotiation’s failure for the implementer. 
Although FRAND commitments seek to constrain both parties 
as they negotiate over price, the SEP holder always has an 
asymmetrically powerful position. A breakdown in 
negotiations—and the resulting failure to reach a licensing 
arrangement—effectively excludes the implementer from 
using the relevant patent and, more importantly, from 
fulfilling the standard. If this breakdown occurs and the 
implementer presses on and fulfills the standard anyway, it 
risks a court finding that the SEP holder did in fact offer a 
FRAND-compliant rate and that the implementer has 
infringed on the SEP holder’s patent. As a result, the 
implementer could face substantial damages liability or an 
 
40 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 16, at 
24 (“[I]f the intellectual property holder is able credibly to commit to selling 
a limited number of licenses, and thus to limiting competition in the 
downstream market, each potential licensee will be willing to pay more for 
a license.” (footnote omitted)). 
41 See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 2, at 
68 (noting the risk of injunctive relief for the SEP holder). 
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injunction blocking it from fulfilling the relevant standard.42 
Meanwhile, the SEP holder faces only the risk that the court 
will find it has violated its contractual FRAND commitments. 
If the implementer wants to avoid this scenario, it either has 
to forego fulfilling the standard (and suffer the costs resulting 
from the lock-in and network effects described above) or avoid 
the entire problem by initially acquiescing to an inflated 
licensing fee that may actually be in violation of the SEP 
holder’s FRAND commitments. 
In addition to Delrahim’s skepticism of patent hold-up, he 
has also asserted that, “[u]nder the antitrust laws . . . a 
unilateral refusal to license a valid patent should be per se 
legal.”43 This cannot be correct. Under the first two theories of 
harm, the SEP holder’s refusal to license a patent in violation 
of its FRAND commitments clearly results in substantial 
anticompetitive effects that directly implicate both antitrust 
and contract law. Under the third theory of harm, the 
implementer requires an additional arrow in its quiver to 
vitalize FRAND commitments and balance the negotiating 
position of the implementer with that of the SEP holder. In 
the event of a refusal to deal, both parties have contract law 
claims, the SEP holder has potential patent law claims, and 
the implementer has potential antitrust law claims.44   
 
42 Melamed & Shapiro commented on this possibility in observing that: 
[P]atent holders are generally able to recover more than the 
ex ante value of the patent when litigation occurs . . . . A 
court-ordered injunction involving such products would 
deprive the implementer of not only the value of the 
technology covered by the patent-in-suit, but also the value 
of the entire product. 
See Melamed & Shapiro, supra note 1, at 2114–15 (footnote omitted). 
43 Delrahim, supra note 29, at 8. 
44 This is in contrast to the reality of today, where an implementer has 
only contract law claims. See, e.g., Jorge Padilla & Koren W. Wong-Ervin, 
Portfolio Licensing to Makers of Downstream End-User Devices: Analyzing 
Refusals to License FRAND-Assured Standard-Essential Patents at the 
Component Level, 62 ANTITRUST BULL. 494, 496–98 (2017) (“[U]nder U.S. 
law . . . [conduct resulting in a breach of a FRAND contract is] properly 
analyzed under contract, not antitrust law . . . .  [T]he evasion of a FRAND 
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There are, however, impediments to aggressive application 
of the antitrust laws against refusals to license by an SEP 
holder. As a general matter, antitrust recognizes only a 
limited range of situations where a refusal to deal is illegal.45  
Additionally, the rights bestowed on the owner of a patent 
make it even more difficult to establish antitrust liability for 
what might be considered anticompetitive conduct in a 
different context. However, it is not the case that antitrust 
disappears whenever a patent is involved, and it is not the 
case that a SEP holder can be considered a typical patent 
holder. As the D.C. Circuit stressed, echoing the Federal 
Circuit, “Intellectual property rights do not confer a privilege 
to violate the antitrust laws.”46  That is undoubtedly true, and 
it should be taken seriously. 
II. THE CASES: REFUSALS TO DEAL 
A. Refusals to Deal at the Supreme Court 
The most recent major Supreme Court decision addressing 
whether  there was antitrust liability for a refusal to deal 
came in 2004 with Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law 
Offices of Curtis V. Trinko (“Trinko”).47 The defendant, 
Verizon, failed to meet its obligation under the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 when it neglected to provide 
operations support to competitors who had purchased 
network elements from Verizon—thus preventing those 
competitors from meeting customer requests and orders.48 
 
assurance . . . does not constitute an antitrust violation.” (footnotes 
omitted)). 
45 See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
46 United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34, 63 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (quoting 
In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 
2000)). 
47 540 U.S. 398, 404–07 (2004) (“The complaint alleges that Verizon 
denied interconnection services to rivals in order to limit entry. If that 
allegation states an antitrust claim at all, it does so under § 2 of the 
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2, which declares that a firm shall not ‘monopolize’ 
or ‘attempt to monopolize.’”). 
48 See id. at 398–402. 
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Verizon was penalized by state and federal communications 
agencies, but the class action suit filed by affected customers 
failed to return a successful verdict, casting doubt on the 
future of antitrust liability for refusals to deal in two ways.49   
First, the Court failed to adopt or employ the “essential 
facilities” doctrine that had previously seen some light at the 
Supreme Court and had been adopted by many lower courts. 
Second, the court declined to extend the spirit and logic of the 
holding in Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. 
(“Aspen Skiing”)50 to new, more marginal facts. But while 
Trinko restricted the scope of antitrust liability for refusals to 
deal and signaled an unwillingness by that Court to entertain 
such claims, it did not extinguish the category of claims 
altogether.  
1. The Essential Facilities Doctrine 
Broadly speaking, the essential facilities doctrine states 
that a firm may incur antitrust liability if it refuses to provide 
other firms access to a necessary facility when, (1) providing 
that access would have been possible and, (2) there is no way 
for the other firms to duplicate or substitute for that access.51 
The typical requirements of the doctrine have been described 
in many lower court opinions, and are clearly expressed in the 
canonical Seventh Circuit case MCI Communications Corp. v. 
American Telephone & Telegraph Co. (“MCI”).52 In MCI, 
AT&T was a monopolist with control over local telephone 
networks.53 MCI was a long-distance competitor of AT&T that 
needed to interconnect to AT&T’s local networks to complete 
MCI customers’ long-distance calls.54 AT&T refused to provide 
those interconnections on various grounds, and the Seventh 
 
49 See id. 
50 Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 
(1985). 
51 See 2 JULIAN O. VON KALINOWSKI ET. AL., ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE 
REGULATION § 25.04(3)(b) (2d ed. 2018). 
52 MCI Commc’ns Corp. v. Am. Telephone & Telegraph Co., 708 F.2d 
1081 (7th Cir. 1983). 
53 See id. at 1093. 
54 See id. at 1095–98. 
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Circuit found AT&T liable under the essential facilities 
doctrine as a result.55 According to the Court, the necessary 
elements to establish liability under the doctrine were: “(1) 
control of the essential facility by a monopolist; (2) a 
competitor’s inability practically or reasonably to duplicate 
the essential facility; (3) the denial of the use of the facility to 
a competitor; and (4) the feasibility of providing the facility.”56 
While lower courts have gradually reduced the application of 
the essential facilities doctrine over time—primarily by 
restricting when a facility is considered truly essential versus 
when it is merely difficult or expensive to go without—the 
doctrine still sees use today.57 
The essential facilities doctrine has not been invoked by 
name at the Supreme Court, but some variation of the concept 
has been in force since at least 1912 with the holding in United 
States v. Terminal Railroad Ass’n of St. Louis.58 That case, 
brought under both Sherman Act Section 1 and Section 2 
theories, involved a group of firms that controlled railroad 
 
55 See id. at 1133. 
56 Id. at 1132–33. 
57 See Brett Frischmann & Spencer Weber Waller, Revitalizing 
Essential Facilities, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 7 (2008) (stating that courts still 
return to the doctrine because “it represents a fundamental understanding 
of the misuse of monopoly power”). 
58 United States v. Terminal R.R Ass’n of St. Louis, 224 U.S. 383, 404 
(1912) (“While, therefore, the mere combining of several independent 
terminal systems into one may not operate as a restraint upon the interstate 
commerce which must use them, yet there may be conditions which will 
bring such a combination under the prohibition of the Sherman Act.”). The 
Court went on to conclude that: 
[W]hen, as here, the inherent conditions are such as to 
prohibit any other reasonable means of entering the city, the 
combination of every such facility under the exclusive 
ownership and control of less than all of the companies 
under compulsion to use them violates both the first and 
second sections of the act, in that it constitutes a contract or 
combination in restraint of commerce among the States and 
an attempt to monopolize commerce among the States which 
must pass through the gateway at St. Louis. 
Id. at 409. 
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access over the Mississippi River to St. Louis.59 The Court 
found that these firms had violated the Sherman Act because 
of the actual control the defendants enjoyed, their intentions 
for acquiring such control, and the actions they took with that 
control.60 The Court held that the defendant firms had to 
make railroad access available to all potential users on fair 
and equal terms.61   
A similar principle—although dealing with intellectual 
property rather than physical infrastructure—motivated the 
Court to decide in favor of the government in Associated Press 
v. United States (“Associated Press”).62 The Supreme Court 
held that the combined effect of the Associated Press By-Laws 
violated the Sherman Act by preventing prospective 
competitors from gaining access to the Associated Press’s 
crucial collection of news.63 The Associated Press (“AP”) was 
(and remains) a massive cooperative association of 
newspapers and journalists who collected and shared news 
with other members.64 Participants in the association were 
barred from selling their news to any newspapers not 
affiliated with the association.65 Meanwhile, any new 
applicants to the Associated Press who would be in 
competition with current AP members had an incredibly 
difficult time gaining admission.66 This allowed existing AP 
members to use the power of the cooperative association to 
deny prospective competitors the chance to enter their 
respective news market and fruitfully compete.67 Although  
 
59 See id. at 390–91. 
60 See id. at 409–10 (“This control and possession constitutes such a 
grip upon the commerce of St. Louis and commerce which must cross the 
river there, whether coming from the east or west as to be both an illegal 
restraint and an attempt to monopolize.”). 
61 See id. at 411–13. 
62 Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945). 
63 See id. at 15–16. 
64 See id. at 3–4. 
65 Id. at 9 (“All members are prohibited from selling or furnishing their 
spontaneous news to any agency or publisher except to AP.”). 
66 See id. at 10 (“Historically, as well as presently, applicants who 
would offer competition to old members have a hard road to travel.”). 
67 See id. at 10–11.  
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not  impossible, the Court found that it would be difficult for 
a market entrant to overcome their “competitive 
disadvantage”68 and compete without access to the substantial 
pool of Associated Press news.69 The Court, therefore, held 
that restrictive conduct by members of an association that 
controlled crucial intellectual property resources was deadly 
to competition and anathema to the Sherman Act. 
An inability to buy news from the largest news agency, 
or any one of its multitude of members, can have most 
serious effects on the publication of competitive 
newspapers . . . Trade restraints of this character, 
aimed at the destruction of competition, tend to block 
the initiative which brings newcomers into a field of 
business and to frustrate the free enterprise system 
which it was the purpose of the Sherman Act to 
protect.70 
Of note, the Court was unimpressed by the classic principle 
that “the owner of the property can choose his associates and 
. . . decide for himself whether and to whom to sell or not to 
sell.”71 As the Court saw it, the right of an individual property 
owner to dispose of one’s property as one willed was 
fundamentally altered by that owner’s membership in an 
organization that wielded such substantial market power that 
it could create rules to accentuate that power and suppress 
new competition.72 Although the factual structure of this case 
is not exactly equivalent to the environment of standards, 
SSOs, and SEP holders, the Associated Press decision is a 
useful model of how antitrust law can deal with organizations 
that develop coordinated intellectual property management 
 
68 See id. at 18. 
69 See id. (“It is true that the record shows that some competing papers 
have gotten along without AP news, but morning newspapers, which control 
96% of the total circulation in the United States, have AP news service.”). 
70 Id. at 13–14. 
71 See id. at 14–15. 
72 See id. at 15 (“Victory of a member of such a combination over its 
business rivals achieved by such collective means . . . can only be attributed 
to that which really makes it possible—the collective power of an unlawful 
combination.”). 
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schemes that are then used by members to stifle competition 
and innovation.  
The most clear-cut and recent case contributing to the 
development of an essential facilities-adjacent Supreme Court 
jurisprudence is Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States (“Otter 
Tail”).73 Otter Tail Power Co. was an electric utility company 
that both sold electric power wholesale over transmission 
lines to distributors and itself acted as a retail distributor of 
electric power in over 400 municipalities.74 Some of the 
municipalities that Otter Tail had previously served as a 
distributor attempted to establish their own municipal power 
systems and handle their own distribution after their 
contracts with Otter Tail expired.75 However, Otter Tail 
refused to wholesale electric power to those municipal 
distribution systems and attempted to restrict their access to 
other sources of power.76 Otter Tail tried to claim to the Court 
that it was immunized from antitrust liability because the 
Federal Power Commission had authority to regulate and 
compel the behavior of Otter Tail, therefore preempting the 
antitrust authorities.77 However, the court found that “[t]here 
is nothing in the legislative history which reveals a purpose to 
insulate electric power companies from the operation of the 
antitrust laws.”78 Otter Tail is an important case because it  
the notion that courts will be particularly skeptical of a 
defendant who uses its control over an essential facility (here, 
the wholesale provision of electrical power) to gain and benefit 
from market power in a downstream market (here, the retail 
distribution of electrical power).79  
 
73 Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973). 
74 Id. at 368. 
75 See id.  
76 See id. at 368–69. In addition to refusing to supply electric power to 
the municipal distribution systems themselves, Otter Tail also refused to 
“wheel” electrical power from other suppliers to municipal distribution 
systems over Otter Tails transmission lines. Id. 
77 Id. at 373. 
78 Id. at 373–74. 
79 See Melamed & Shapiro, supra note 1, at 2126. 
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When the Supreme Court denied that Verizon had 
antitrust liability in Trinko, it did so without directly 
recognizing or refuting the essential facilities doctrine. 
Instead, Justice Scalia stated that the Court’s conclusion in 
the case would have been unchanged if it had applied the 
doctrine.80 While the lower courts had previously narrowed 
the doctrine over the years by limiting what qualified as an 
essential facility, Scalia took another approach to the 
retrenchment and instead emphasized that the existence of a 
regulatory scheme with the power to impose sharing duties on 
the owner of a critical or unique facility made it unnecessary 
to “impose a judicial doctrine of forced access.”81 Thus, the 
Court deemed antitrust, and the essential facilities doctrine, 
superfluous when there was already a government agency 
with the ability to create access to the essential facility in 
question. 
Justice Scalia distinguished the importance of the 
regulatory powers present in the background of Trinko from 
those in Otter Tail—where the defendant had also argued that 
a regulatory scheme insulated it from antitrust liability—by 
pointing out that “the services allegedly withheld [in Trinko] 
are not otherwise marketed or available to the public,” but 
were instead created by Verizon to comply with the 1996 
Telecommunications Act.82 This was unlike the situation in 
Otter Tail, where “the defendant was already in the business 
of providing a service to certain customers . . .  and refused to 
provide the same service to certain other customers.”83 As the 
Court said in Otter Tail, the market relationships in that case 
were “governed in the first instance by business judgment and 
not regulatory coercion” and “the limited authority of the 
Federal Power Commission to order interconnections” did not 
 
80 See Verizon Commc’s, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 
540 U.S. 398, 410 (2004) (“[The Court’s] conclusion would be unchanged 
even if we considered to be established law the ‘essential facilities’ doctrine 
crafted by some lower courts . . . .”). 
81 See id. at 411. 
82 Id. at 410. 
83 Id. 
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displace the role of antitrust law.84 Of course, one can question 
the actual importance of these distinctions and see the 
inflection point in the diverging decisions as a change in the 
court’s approach to the impact of regulatory frameworks on 
the application of antitrust law. 
Clearly, Trinko did not contribute to the vitality of the 
essential facilities doctrine at the Supreme Court level. 
However, neither did it create forceful or specific precedent 
that went against the doctrine. Trinko was more noteworthy 
as a clear signal of how skeptical that Court would be of 
Section 2 cases in general—and refusal to deal cases in 
particular—than it was as a direct repudiation of previous 
decisions. But the composition of the court changes over time, 
and it would not be difficult for a future Supreme Court to 
take up a refusal to deal case sharply distinguished85 from the 
facts of Trinko and apply a version of the essential facilities 
doctrine. 
2. The Logic of Aspen Skiing 
The Trinko Court also declined the opportunity to follow in 
the footsteps of Aspen Skiing and extend antitrust liability for 
refusals to deal based on the holding in that case. The 
defendant in Aspen, Aspen Skiing Co., refused to continue 
offering a six-day pass that could be used at any of three ski 
mountains owned by the defendant and one owned by the 
plaintiff, Aspen Highlands.86 Prior to the litigation, the 
parties had jointly offered the pass—or some substantially 
similar variation of the pass—for years and profitably divided 
the revenues it generated based on customer usage of their 
respective mountains.87 While recognizing that a firm 
typically has no general duty to cooperate or deal with any 
 
84 Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 374 (1973).  
85 In particular, a case where the market in question was not already 
closely and comprehensively regulated by Congress and government 
agencies—a market dependent on private interests. 
86 See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 
590–94 (1985).  
87 See id. at 587–93. 
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another firm, the Aspen Skiing Court noted that, “[t]he high 
value that we have placed on the right to refuse to deal with 
other firms does not mean that the right is unqualified.”88  
That right ran aground on its antitrust limits in Aspen Skiing. 
The Court held that there was a Section 2 violation because 
the defendant was a monopolist that had terminated a prior 
course of dealing89 at the expense of short-run profits—
without any “efficiency” (i.e. valid business) justification.90  
The Trinko Court distinguished Verizon’s behavior from 
that of Aspen Skiing Co. by pointing to the fact that the prior 
course of dealing in Aspen Skiing had been voluntary, while 
Verizon had been obligated to deal with competitors by the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 and ongoing regulation from 
various government agencies. As a result, Verizon’s cessation 
of dealings or reluctance to engage in further dealings had no 
probative value regarding its anticompetitive intent.91 
Verizon was simply backing away from a course of commercial 
conduct that it had never willingly entered into in the first 
instance. In addition to highlighting the differences between 
the two cases, Justice Scalia also emphasized that Aspen 
Skiing itself was a fringe Section 2 case rather than something 
 
88 Id. at 601. 
89 See id. at 603 (“[T]he monopolist did not merely reject a novel offer 
to participate in a cooperative venture that had been proposed by a 
competitor. Rather, the monopolist elected to make an important change in 
a pattern of distribution that had originated in a competitive market and 
had persisted for several years.”). 
90 See id. at 608 (“The jury may well have concluded that Ski Co. elected 
to forgo these short-run benefits because it was more interested in reducing 
competition in the Aspen market over the long run by harming its smaller 
competitor. That conclusion is strongly supported by Ski Co.’s failure to offer 
any efficiency justification . . . .”); see also id. at 610–11 (“[T]he evidence 
supports an inference that Ski Co. was not motivated by efficiency concerns 
and that it was willing to sacrifice short-run benefits and consumer goodwill 
in exchange for a perceived long-run impact on its smaller rival.”). 
91 See Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 
540 U.S. 398, 409 (2004) (“The complaint does not allege that Verizon 
voluntarily engaged in a course of dealing with its rivals, or would ever have 
done so absent statutory compulsion. Here, therefore, the defendant’s prior 
conduct sheds no light upon the motivation of its refusal to deal . . . .”). 
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at the core of antitrust doctrine that future plaintiffs could 
confidently rely on.92  
The skepticism towards Sherman Act Section 2 claims and 
the applicability of Aspen Skiing evinced by the Court in 
Trinko cast a pall on antitrust litigation, especially litigation 
based on refusals to deal. However, it did not reject the 
concepts and precedent which would be necessary to sustain 
future refusal to deal claims based primarily on some version 
of the essential facilities doctrine.93 Meanwhile, facts 
analogous to those in Aspen Skiing remain at least a point in 
favor for plaintiffs alleging an anticompetitive refusal to deal. 
Therefore, antitrust liability for refusals to deal may still be 
established through the historically valid methods: by a 
showing of anticompetitive intent or through the essential 
facilities doctrine.94 It remains a possibility that arguments—
and potentially even arguments in the context of intellectual 
property—based on the logic of the essential facilities doctrine 
and the general circumstances of Aspen Skiing could be 
successfully employed in the lower courts and eventually at 




92 Id. (“Aspen Skiing is at or near the outer boundary of § 2 liability.”). 
93 See Joseph P. Bauer, Refusals to Deal with Competitors by Owners of 
Patents and Copyrights: Reflections on the Image Technical and Xerox 
Decisions, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 1211, 1245 (2006) (“Thus, Trinko does not 
undermine the Supreme Court’s earlier decisions that refusals to deal may 
form the predicate of a violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act.”). 
94 See Simon Genevaz, Against Immunity for Unilateral Refusals to 
Deal in Intellectual Property: Why Antitrust Law Should Not Distinguish 
Between IP and Other Property Rights, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 741, 752 
(2004) (“The illegality of a refusal to deal may be proved by a plaintiff using 
either: (1) the so-called ‘intent’ test, which is the traditional analysis of 
monopolization under Section 2 of the Sherman Act; or (2) the essential 
facilities doctrine.” (footnote omitted)); see also Seungwoo Son, Selective 
Refusals to Sell Patented Goods: The Relationship Between Patent Rights 
and Antitrust Law, 2002 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 109, 118 (2002) (“In 
condemning refusals to deal, courts have applied two theoretical tests – 
‘intent’ and ‘essential facility.’ A combination of these two approaches is also 
available.” (footnotes omitted)).  
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B. Refusals to Deal and Intellectual Property in the 
Courts of Appeal 
Although the following cases do not directly address the 
situation of a refusal to deal by a standard essential patent 
holder,  a set of important circuit court decisions establish a 
spectrum of approaches to refusals to deal by patent holders 
in general.95 As standard essential patent holders are a subset 
of this larger group, it is obvious that this set of cases 
structures the litigation landscape for SEP holders and their 
potential antitrust liability. Some circuit courts take a 
position that is contrary to presumptive Section 2 liability for 
refusals to deal by SEP holders, and even the circuits more 
skeptical of refusals to deal by patent holders fail to go as far 
as establishing presumptive liability. Of course, the inclusion 
of a patent in a standard fundamentally alters the power of 
the patent holder and makes aggressive antitrust treatment 
more sensible than it would be if applied to a typical patent 
holder. Despite this distinction, the position of a circuit which 
has held that there is near immunity for refusals to deal by a 
patent holder is irreconcilable with a presumption of liability 
approach for SEP holders who do the same. 
One of the most widely discussed—and criticized—cases 
affording patent holders near-immunity from antitrust 
liability is the 2000 Federal Circuit case, In re Independent 
Service Organizations Antitrust Litigation (“CSU v. Xerox”).96 
Xerox manufactured and serviced its own high-volume 
copying equipment, and eventually took steps to restrict 
independent service operators’ (ISOs) access to replacement 
parts for Xerox copiers.97 Xerox first refrained from selling 
replacement parts for one line of copiers to a select group of 
large ISOs, and then further restricted sales by shutting out 
 
95 The Supreme Court has not directly addressed SEP refusals to 
license, or even IP refusals to license. See Michael A. Carrier, Refusals to 
License Intellectual Property After Trinko, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 1191, 1209 
(2006). 
96 In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 
2000). 
97 See id. at 1324. 
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more ISOs from more copier lines and forcing other 
replacement parts retailers to stop selling to ISOs.98  In 1994, 
CSU opted out of a class action settlement that other ISOs 
agreed to and then sued Xerox for violating the Sherman 
Act.99 CSU alleged that Xerox attempted to eliminate CSU 
and other ISOs from the high-volume copier and printer 
service market by selling its patented parts to ISOs for higher 
prices than it did to end-users, making it impossible for ISOs 
to compete with Xerox on price.100 
The court decided in favor of Xerox, holding that 
intellectual property holders could refuse to deal—and 
thereby exclude competitors from as many markets as they 
saw fit101—without the fear of antitrust liability, provided that 
they were operating “within the scope” of their copyright or 
patent.102 This remained true regardless of the “subjective 
motivation” for the holders’ refusal to sell or license their 
intellectual property.103 The only exceptions to this antitrust 
immunity were if a patent holder engaged in illegal tying, 
 
98 See id. 
99 See id. 
100 See id. 
101 See id. at 1327 (“In fact, we have expressly held that, absent 
exceptional circumstances, a patent may confer the right to exclude 
competition altogether in more than one antitrust market.”). 
102 Responding to this possibility, the court remarked: 
[Cited language from precedent] does nothing to limit the 
right of the patentee to refuse to sell or license in markets 
within the scope of the statutory patent grant . . . . We 
therefore will not inquire into his subjective motivation for 
exerting his statutory rights, even though his refusal to sell 
or license his patented invention may have an 
anticompetitive effect, so long as that anticompetitive effect 
is not illegally extended beyond the statutory patent grant. 
See id. at 1327–28. 
103 See id. at 1327 (“We see no more reason to inquire into the subjective 
motivation of Xerox in refusing to sell or license its patented works than we 
found in evaluating the subjective motivation of a patentee in bringing suit 
to enforce that same right.”). 
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fraud in the acquisition of the patent, or sham litigation.104 
The resulting rule on refusals to deal provided unique 
privileges to intellectual property holders far greater than 
those enjoyed by other property holders.105 With CSU v. Xerox, 
the Federal Circuit took a much more confident stand in favor 
of intellectual property holders over their competitors than 
other circuits had. Although the decision did not set out to 
derogate antitrust law to second-class status under patent 
and copyright law, the effect of the decision was to do just 
that.106 
The case that stands most obviously in opposition to CSU 
v. Xerox is the Ninth Circuit’s 1997 decision in Image 
Technical Services v. Eastman Kodak Co. (“Image 
Technical”).107 These cases are excellent foils for many 
reasons, but the sheer similarity of their facts makes them 
particularly ripe for comparison. Kodak was also a 
manufacturer and repairer of its own high-volume 
photocopiers.108 As competitive pressure for repair services 
from ISOs mounted against them, Kodak too began refusing 
 
104 Id. (“In the absence of any indication of illegal tying, fraud in the 
Patent and Trademark Office, or sham litigation, the patent holder may 
enforce the statutory right to exclude others . . . .”). 
105 See Genevaz, supra note 94, at 744 (“Xerox establishes a rule of pe 
se legality. The Federal Circuit’s solution thus sets forth a novel test of 
legality of refusals to deal specific to intellectual property that is separate 
and distinct from the test applicable to other types of property.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
106 See Bauer, supra note 93, at 1216–17 (“The Federal Circuit’s 
conclusion in Xerox is not the product of an express elevation of intellectual 
property law over antitrust. As a practical matter, however, it reaches 
precisely that result . . . .”); see also A. Douglas Melamed & Ali M. 
Stoeppelwerth, The CSU Case: Facts, Formalism and the Intersection of 
Antitrust and Intellectual Property Law, 10 GEO. MASON L. REV. 407, 414 
(2002) (“Not surprisingly, CSU and similar cases pay scant attention to the 
legal basis for an antitrust immunity and focus, instead, on notions of policy. 
These cases appear to be based on a belief that antitrust immunity is 
necessary in order to further the objectives of the intellectual property laws 
. . . .”). 
107 Image Tech. Servs., Inc., v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195 (9th. 
Cir. 1997). 
108 See id. at 1200. 
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to sell photocopier replacement parts to ISOs and signed 
agreements with third party parts manufacturers to have 
them do the same.109 Some ISOs alleged that this parts 
shortage drove them out of business.110 In 1987, a class of ISOs 
filed a lawsuit against Kodak; the class action suit went up to 
the Supreme Court111 before eventually finding its way back 
to the Ninth Circuit for a review of the jury verdict and the 
District Court’s ten year injunction.112  
The Ninth Circuit held that a fact-finder should presume 
that the refusal to deal by an intellectual property holder was 
done for legitimate business reasons—including a desire to 
profit from its IP rights—and was therefore procompetitive 
and legal.113 But this presumption of legitimacy could be 
rebutted by evidence that the proffered business reasons were 
a pretext for anticompetitive conduct.114 Kodak argued that its 
subjective motivation for refusing to license was irrelevant115 
(just as the Federal Circuit held in CSU v. Xerox), but the 
Image Technical court disagreed116 and found that the 
evidence available made it “more probable than not that the 
jury would have found Kodak’s presumptively valid business 
justification rebutted on the grounds of pretext.”117 
 
109 See id. at 1201. 
110 Id. at 1200–01. 
111 The Court ruled against Kodak on its motion for summary 
judgement. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 
451 (1992). 
112 125 F.3d at 1200. 
113 See id. at 1219 (“Kodak may assert that its desire to profit from its 
intellectual property rights justifies its conduct, and the jury should 
presume that this justification is legitimately procompetitive.”). 
114 Id. (“The presumption may also be rebutted by evidence of pretext. 
Neither the aims of intellectual property law, nor the antitrust laws justify 
allowing a monopolist to rely upon a pretextual business justification to 
mask anticompetitive conduct.”). 
115 See id. 
116 See id. (“Evidence regarding the state of mind of Kodak employees 
may show pretext, when such evidence suggests that the proffered business 
justification played no part in the decision to act.”). 
117  Id. at 1219–20 (footnote omitted). 
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Neither the Federal Circuit nor the Ninth Circuit 
approached their cases by relying on the essential facilities 
doctrine. Instead, the Federal Circuit held that intellectual 
property holders could refuse to deal without antitrust 
liability in all but a very few circumstances—basically, where 
the IP right was acquired or used fraudulently. The Ninth 
Circuit differed in a crucial respect, holding that the 
presumptive legality of a refusal to deal was rebuttable by 
evidence—including evidence of subjective motivation—that 
the rights holder had only pretextual procompetitive 
justifications that actually shielded an anticompetitive intent.   
Both courts referenced an influential 1994 First Circuit 
decision, Data General Corp. v. Grumman Systems Support 
Corp. (“Data General”),118 in grounding their own decisions. 
The Data General court was the first to use the rebuttable 
presumption of legality framework for refusals to deal by IP 
holders.119 The First Circuit noted that a “unilateral refusal to 
deal is prima facie exclusionary if there is evidence of harm to 
the competitive process[,]”120 but that this could be rebutted 
by a valid business justification. Valid business justifications 
were plentiful, so liability for unilateral refusals to deal 
largely remained a “theoretical possibility.”121 For instance, 
when it came to copyright, the simple desire to exclude others 
from use of the protected work was a presumptively valid 
business justification even in the face of evidence of harm to 
the competitive process or consumers.122 The disparate 
interpretations of Data General by the courts in CSU v. Xerox 
and in Image Technical stem from the relative ambiguity in 
the First Circuit’s opinion123 and from a footnote that says the 
presumption of a valid business justification can be rebutted 
 
118 Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147 (1st 
Cir. 1994). 
119 Carrier, supra note 95, at 1194. 
120 Data General, 36 F.3d at 1183. 
121 See id. 
122 See id. at 1187. 
123 To be fair, it was a ground-breaking opinion addressing a problem 
that remains unsettled to this day. 
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in “rare cases.”124 Those rare cases were not expounded upon, 
and so CSU v. Xerox filled in evidence of fraud or abuse and 
Image Technical filled in evidence of subjective, 
anticompetitive intent.   
C. FTC v. Qualcomm Inc.: A First Embrace of 
Antitrust Liability for SEP Holders 
The Ninth Circuit now has the opportunity to squarely 
address whether an SEP holder who refuses to license its 
SEPs to competitors has violated antitrust laws when it hears 
FTC v. Qualcomm Inc. (“FTC v. Qualcomm”) on appeal from a 
jury trial in the Northern District of California.125 In FTC v. 
Qualcomm, the district court issued a more than 200 page 
opinion that addressed a litany of FRAND, antitrust, and 
contract claims brought against Qualcomm.126 Among those 
issues was whether Qualcomm “ha[d] a duty under the 
Sherman Act to license its SEPs to rival modem chip 
suppliers.”127 The district court found that Qualcomm did.128 
The FTC v. Qualcomm court first discussed the Supreme 
Court precedent on refusals to deal from both Aspen Skiing 
and Trinko, highlighting the factual differences in those cases 
that resulted in liability for the defendant in Aspen Skiing and 
none for the defendant in Trinko.129 Next, the district court 
 
124 See Data General, 36 F.3d at 1187 n.64. 
125 FTC v. Qualcomm Inc., No. 17-CV-00220-LHK, 2019 WL 2206013 
(N.D. Cal. May 21, 2019), reh’g granted, FTC v. Qualcomm Inc., 935 F.3d 
752, 757 (9th Cir. 2019) (granting stay of the injunction and setting the 
hearing for January 2020). 
126 See generally Qualcomm, 2019 WL 2206013. 
127 Id. at *81. Qualcomm’s refusal to license its SEPs to rival modem 
chip makers—instead licensing its SEPs only to modem manufacturers who 
purchased Qualcomm chips for use in their products—is a version of the 
first theory of anticompetitive harm described in this Note, supra Section 
II.C. 
128 See Qualcomm, 2019 WL 2206013 at *81. 
129 See id. at *82 (“[T]he United States Supreme Court in Trinko held 
that the plaintiffs had failed to show that Verizon’s conduct fell within 
Aspen Skiing’s exception to the general no-duty-to-deal rule.” (citing 
Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 
398, 408–09 (2004))). 
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turned to MetroNet Services Corporation v. Qwest Corporation 
(“MetroNet”)130—a Ninth Circuit case that reconciled the 
different outcomes in Aspen Skiing and Trinko by identifying 
three factors that the Supreme Court considered relevant to 
finding antitrust liability for a refusal to deal.131 Those 
factors,—which were present for the defendant in Aspen 
Skiing but not Trinko—were: (1) the defendant’s “unilateral 
termination of a voluntary and profitable course of 
dealing[,]”132 (2) that the circumstances of defendant’s refusal 
to deal suggested that the defendant had anticompetitive 
intent,133 and (3) that the defendant refused to sell a product 
to a competitor when that product was sold to other 
customers.134  
 The district court applied the MetroNet test and found that 
Qualcomm’s refusal to license SEPs to competitors met the 
first factor for antitrust liability: “Qualcomm previously 
licensed [rival chip makers], as its FRAND commitments 
require,”135 but then voluntarily ceased licensing despite the 
fact that the collection of patent royalties was still “profitable 
for Qualcomm.”136 The court found that Qualcomm’s conduct 
also fulfilled the second factor: statements by Qualcomm 
officers and internal Qualcomm documents indicated that it 
refused to license to rival chip makers in order to exclude 
those rivals from the market and protect the “unreasonably 
high royalty rates” that Qualcomm earned from modem 
manufacturers.137 Finally, the court found that the third 
factor was present as well: Qualcomm did not refuse to license 
modem chip SEPs to rivals because doing so would have 
 
130 See MetroNet Servs. Corp. v. Qwest Corp., 383 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 
2004). 
131 See Qualcomm, 2019 WL 2206013 at *82–85 (citing MetroNet, 383 
F.3d at 1131–32). 
132 Id. at *82 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
133 See id. (citation omitted). 
134 See id. (citation omitted). 
135 Id. at *83. 
136 Id. 
137 See id. at *83–84. 
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required it to enter a new market.138 To the contrary, it opted 
to cease licensing to rival chipmakers despite “an existing 
market for modem chip SEPs.”139 With all three factors 
suggesting antitrust liability satisfied, the district court found 
that “Qualcomm has an antitrust duty to license its SEPs to 
rival modem chip suppliers.”140 It remains to be seen if the 
Ninth Circuit agrees. 
III. ANTITRUST LIABILITY: WHEN SEP HOLDERS 
REFUSE TO DEAL 
A. Reasons for a Presumption of Antitrust Liability 
The affirmative case for a presumption of antitrust liability 
when a SEP holder refuses to deal with a prospective standard 
implementer in violation of its FRAND commitments 
proceeds, from the above discussion, as follows: (1) the 
standard setting process is of vital importance for many 
industries and technologies, but confers incredible and 
abusable power to SEP holders,141 (2) despite Trinko, the 
Supreme Court has not ruled out either the essential facilities 
doctrine or an intent-based inquiry for a Sherman Act Section 
2 refusal to deal case,142 and (3) the leading circuit court 
decisions that consider refusals to deal by patent holders in 
general do not offer policy or legal objections which support an 
argument against presuming antitrust liability when the 
patent holder owns a standard essential patent.143 As a result, 
a refusal to deal by an SEP holder is dangerously 
anticompetitive conduct that is—on its face—exactly the sort 
of conduct which has been, and should be, condemned by the 
antitrust laws.   
Standards are crucial to the modern economy. But the 
factors that make standards valuable, even necessary, in so 
 
138 See id. at *84–85. 
139 Id. at *85. 
140 Id. 
141 See supra Part II. 
142 See supra Section III.A. 
143 See supra Section III.B. 
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many industries are the same factors that lead to SEP holders 
occupying a dangerous position from the perspective of the 
antitrust laws: standards help coordinate disparate 
technologies and products from many firms into a 
consolidated, cohesive set. This enables interoperability, 
access, and the accumulation of massive network effects.144 
Given those valuable network effects, SEP holders who 
engage with the process of standards development and make 
FRAND commitments become ex post gatekeepers—
regardless of their ex ante position in the market—to the 
implementation of standards and thereby control access to the 
entire market. If an SEP holder then violates its FRAND 
commitments by refusing to deal, the SEP holder has 
exhibited all of the markers of a Section 2 case that results in 
liability.   
First, the SEP holder has acquired control over access to 
an essential facility (the relevant standard) and then denied 
competitors access to that facility (by refusing to license a 
patent necessary to fulfill the standard).145 Although the same 
refusal to license its patent might have been acceptable if the 
SEP holder was not part of the SSO and the patent was not 
part of the standard, the market power and bargaining 
position of the patent holder is fundamentally altered when a 
patent becomes standard essential. This is reminiscent of 
Associated Press, except here the coordinating organization 
attempted to prevent the abuse of the SEP holder’s position 
by securing FRAND commitments from them.146 It is therefore 
 
144 See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 2, at 
16. 
145 See Lao, supra note 22, at 561–62 (“Because of network effects, 
markets tend to ‘tip’ toward a ‘winner-take-all’ . . . scenario, where a single 
standard emerges to control the market . . . . [A] monopolist controlling the 
link has the ability to foreclose competition . . . .” (footnote omitted)). 
146 In Associated Press, participants in the association used AP by-laws 
to prevent new applicants from entering the association in order to keep 
those new applicants from gaining access to the massive pool of AP news 
material and becoming a competitor. This transformed the cooperative 
purpose of the association into an anticompetitive sword. Likewise, SEP 
holders who refuse to license a SEP to a prospective implementer of a given 
standard turn that cooperatively built standard into an anticompetitive 
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the deviant behavior of the SEP holder, not the SSO itself, 
that is to blame for the anticompetitive harm.147 
Second, the salient facts of a refusal to deal by an SEP 
holder are closely analogous to those of Aspen Skiing. The 
defendant monopolist was found liable in Aspen Skiing for two 
primary reasons: it had terminated a prior course of voluntary 
dealing and it had sacrificed short-run profits in order to harm 
a competitor.148 Although an SEP holder may not have 
previously dealt with any given prospective standard 
implementer, the SEP holder’s participation in the SSO and 
its FRAND commitments constitute a prior course of dealing 
with all fellow participants and implementers of the standard. 
The subsequent violation of contractual FRAND 
commitments is a clear termination of that course of dealing. 
Additionally, licensing an SEP at a reasonable rate is, in 
isolation, obviously profitable for an SEP holder in the short-
run (compared to an alternative world where the SEP holder 
earns no licensing revenue). The failure to profitably license 
at a reasonable rate raises, as it did in Aspen Skiing, a strong 
inference that the goal of the refusal to deal is 
 
sword. The added wrinkle is that this anticompetitive behavior violates the 
rules of the organizing entity (the SSO), which requires SEP holders to 
make FRAND licensing commitments. See Associated Press v. United 
States, 326 U.S. 1, 26–27, 29 (1945). 
147 Recently, scholars have discussed the possibility of greater antitrust 
scrutiny of SSOs and their rules in order to combat the abuse of standards. 
Specifically, Melamed & Shapiro have noted that: 
The antitrust principle is straightforward: industry-wide 
collaboration through SSOs to establish procompetitive 
standards is permitted only if it is no more restrictive of 
competition than reasonably necessary to enable creation of 
the standards . . . Under this principle, SSO procedures and 
FRAND rules should be evaluated based on whether they 
lead to reasonable SEP royalties . . . . 
Melamed & Shapiro, supra note 1, at 2134. 
148 Note that this could either be taken as a set of facts generally 
relevant for Section 2 cases or just a subset of how to show anticompetitive 
intent in a refusal to deal. In either case, the similarity of the facts is the 
relevant consideration.   
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anticompetitive.149  Even if the conduct in Aspen Skiing is at 
the outer edge of Section 2 liability, it still falls within the 
boundaries of Section 2 liability. A FRAND-violating refusal 
to deal by an SEP holder, resembling the important features 
of Aspen Skiing as closely as it does, must also fall within that 
boundary.150  
Finally, the burden of an inquiry into the intent of the SEP 
holder should be exactly reversed from what it was when the 
circuit courts considered refusals to license intellectual 
property more broadly. In those circuit court cases, the 
business justifications of the rights holders were treated as 
presumptively valid and defensible in light of the point of the 
intellectual property laws. Rather than appearing to be 
anticompetitive on its face, a refusal to deal seemed well 
within the ambit of reasonable, legislatively-permitted 
behavior by a firm holding valuable patents or copyrights. But 
the inclusion of a patent in a standard is transformative for a 
firm, and the firm becomes something much more than just 
another intellectual property rights holder. At that point, the 
subsequent violation of FRAND commitments is actually 
anticompetitive on its face: it loudly proclaims that the SEP 
holder has recognized its power in the market and decided to 
turn that power toward damaging the competitive process 
that it had previously contracted to protect and promote.151 
 
149 Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. at 610–
611 (“[T]he evidence supports an inference that Ski Co. was not motivated 
by efficiency concerns and that it was willing to sacrifice short-run benefits 
and consumer goodwill in exchange for a perceived long-run impact on its 
smaller rival.”). 
150 See, e.g., FTC v. Qualcomm Inc., No. 17-CV-00220-LHK, 2019 WL 
2206013 at *82–85 (N.D. Cal. May 21, 2019), reh’g granted, FTC v. 
Qualcomm Inc., 935 F.3d 752, 757 (9th Cir. 2019). 
151 The district court in FTC v. Qualcomm did not take a presumptive 
antitrust liability approach to Qualcomm’s conduct in that case. Qualcomm, 
2019 WL 2206013, at *82–85. However, the three MetroNet factors that the 
court relied on to find Qualcomm liable for an antitrust violation would each 
be present in the typical case of an SEP holder’s refusal to license. See supra 
Section III.C. This further suggests that a presumption of liability would be 
warranted (and particularly useful in cases with less overtly 
anticompetitive statements and documents than were present in FTC v. 
Qualcomm). 
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The presumption of antitrust liability for a SEP holder 
suggests that it should be presumed to not have a valid 
business justification when refusing to deal.  The SEP holder 
would have the burden of rebutting this presumption before 
the court and substantiating a legitimate, procompetitive 
business justification for the refusal to deal.  
B. Contrary Considerations 
The strongest counterargument against presumptive 
antitrust liability for SEP holders who violate their FRAND 
commitments with a refusal to deal—and against any version 
of the essential facilities doctrine—is based in the fear that 
this approach to competition policy would lead to reduced 
investment and innovation.152 The general form of the 
argument is that forcing firms to deal with competitors might 
increase competition in the short-run, but in the long-run it 
will reduce the incentive to innovate153 because innovative 
firms will know that they will not be able to fully capitalize on 
a successful investment.154 This concern is particularly strong 
in the realm of intellectual property. After all, these rights 
were specifically developed to give innovators and creators the 
ability to exclude others from copying and devaluing their 
work.155 This increases the value of intellectual property to the 
 
152 See Frischmann & Waller, supra note 57, at 31–32 (“[A]n overly 
expansive application of the essential facilities doctrine will reduce the 
incentives of the incumbent firm to invest in the facility in the first place, 
[and] reduce the incentives for the unintegrated competitor to seek to 
innovate or invent, encourage free riding on the incumbent’s facility . . . . ”). 
153 Or—in the case of the traditional essential facilities doctrine—
reduce the incentive to make the large investments necessary to develop 
critical infrastructure that then becomes an essential facility.  
154 See Howard A. Shelanski, Unilateral Refusals to Deal in Intellectual 
and Other Property, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 369, 371 (2009) (“It is commonly 
argued that if a firm must share with competitors the gains derived from 
costly innovation, it will innovate less than if it can decide for itself when, 
with whom, and on what terms it will trade.”).  
155 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING 
PATENT NOTICE AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 1 (2011), 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2011/03/110307patentreport.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/A2HU-KWTN]. 
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owner and, in turn, encourages the creation of more 
intellectual property. Without the power to exclude 
competitors, a patent holder would have very little reason to 
take the risks and make the investments needed in order to 
develop a new idea or technology. 
However, arguments of this form are often true at the 
extreme but not necessarily correct at the margin.156 The 
complete lack of protection for intellectual property rights 
would be devastating for creators and inventors and would 
drastically reduce the incentives to innovate. But this does not 
mean that reducing the protections for intellectual property 
will always reduce the incentives for innovation to a greater 
degree than it will have positive, structural effects on the 
market.157 To the contrary, this Note argues that antitrust 
liability will have positive, structural effects on the market 
which benefit competition and innovation more than the 
reduced incentives will harm competition and innovation. 
Still, this debate is fertile ground for further discussion, 
inquiry, and empirical research. 
Another possible objection to antitrust liability—this time 
on statutory rather than policy grounds—is that the Patent 
 
156 See the discussion of Katz & Shelanski, who state that: 
[T]here is a fear that [antitrust policy typically imposing  
duties to deal or share assets with rivals] might increase 
competition in the short run but discourage investment in 
the long run.  Nevertheless, the force of this argument is a 
limited one.  At some point, the benefits of an incremental 
increase in innovation incentives will be outweighed by the 
harms from the loss of static competition. 
Michael L. Katz & Howard A. Shelanski, “Schumpeterian” Competition and 




157 See Shelanski, supra note 154, at 370–71 (“There is also consensus 
that the short-run and long-run effects of refusals to deal often, if not 
usually, move in opposite directions . . . . Where the consensus breaks down 
is over views of how successfully courts and the agencies can identify and 
balance the effects . . . .”(emphasis added) (footnote omitted)). 
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Act158 created immunity for unilateral refusals to license 
patents.159 The Federal Circuit adopted a version of this 
approach in CSU v. Xerox. The court based its decision, in 
part, on an inference that, “[t]he patentee’s right to exclude is 
further supported by [S]ection 271(d) of the Patent Act.”160 But 
this view is not widely held by academics,161 other courts,162 or 
the DOJ or FTC.163 A full examination of the Patent Act is 
outside the scope of this Note, but the idea that § 271(d) 
created broad antitrust immunity for intellectual property 
owners is a relatively fringe view.  
Finally, it could be argued that the Supreme Court has 
recently expressed a reluctance to endorse either the essential 
facilities doctrine or the logic of Aspen Skiing. So, a new 
presumption of antitrust liability grounded in their fruitful 
combination is extremely unlikely in the near term. This 
argument is probably correct. But the question of what the 
law affords and what should be done with that affordance is 
separate from the question of what a particular court is likely 
 
158 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2012). 
159 The First Circuit mused about this possibility in its 1994 Data 
General decision. “Section 271(d) clearly prevents an infringer from using a 
patent misuse defense when the patent owner has unilaterally refused a 
license, and may even herald the prohibition of all antitrust claims and 
counterclaims premised on a refusal to license a patent.” Data Gen. Corp. v. 
Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1187 (1st Cir. 1994) (emphasis 
added).  
160 In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1326 (Fed. 
Cir. 2000). 
161 See e.g., Melamed & Stoeppelwerth, supra note 106, at 411 
(“Neither the general language in that section nor any other provision in 
either the Patent Act or the Copyright Act compels the conclusion that 
Congress intended the exercise of those property rights to be exempt from 
the antitrust laws.”). 
162 See Image Tech. Servs. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1214 
n.7 (9th. Cir. 1997) (“The amended statutory language does not compel 
[antitrust immunity], and Calkins and other commentators agree that § 
271(d)(4) merely codified existing law.”). 
163 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 16, at 6 
(“Section 271(d)(4) of the Patent Act does not create antitrust immunity for 
unilateral refusals to license patents.”).  
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to do. Presumptive antitrust liability for SEP holders may be 
wise today, unlikely tomorrow, and a reality the day after. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This Note does not argue that an SEP holder should be 
prevented from benefiting when its patents lend value to a 
standard; this Note argues that an SEP holder should be 
prevented from benefiting when it attempts to abuse its 
position as a gatekeeper to a vital, collaborative standard. A 
presumption of antitrust liability for an SEP holder who 
refuses to deal in violation of its FRAND commitments 
accomplishes this balance. In some dynamic markets, the 
returns to innovation and the cycle of creative destruction are 
enough to ensure competition and progress.164 But in 
standards-driven markets that derive their value from the 
coordinated creation of networks, the antitrust laws are an 
important bulwark of continued competition and growth.165 
They should be used accordingly.   
 
 
164 See Katz & Shelanski, supra note 156, at 5 (“Creative destruction 
means that a firm’s acquisition of possession of market power may be 
fleeting and that firms must protect such power through ongoing innovation 
efforts. Under constant pressure from actual and potential innovators, the 
incumbent firm itself produces better products on better terms for 
consumers . . . .”).  
165 See Lao, supra note 22, at 562 (“Combined with a closed network 
system, network effects can, therefore, effectively create or reinforce 
existing entry barriers, insulate the monopolist from competition, and lock 
consumers into the existing technology.”). 
